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Working Paper '231 
Sept- 1986 
NOOSE OR LIFELINE? 
THE ROLE CF ?RANSFORT IN INDEFENDEKC MlMIBIA 
Paper prepared for the Qnference on the Southern 
African &onany After Apartheid; University of York; 29 
September - 2 October 1986. 
ITS Working Papers are intended to lsovi.de infornation and 
ellcourage discussion on a topic in advance of formal 
publication. lhey represent only the view of the authors 
and do not necessarily reflect the views or approval of 
spnsors . 
As the struggle to Qld apartheid i n  South Africa 
intensifies, attention has increasingly been distracted fran the 
vexed issue of Namibian independence. All  plrties to the 
dispute have agreed for a t  least eight years on the desirability 
of independence for Africa's last colons but attainment of that 
goal has been continually £rustrated by South Africa; through the 
intrcdwtion of new cbstacles. The current deadlcck is over 
Pretoria's insistence that independence be linked to  the 
withdram1 of Cuban troops fran Angola. MeanvhFle, yet another 
interim gwerment has been appointed i n  Wirdhcek; onto &ich 
South Africa i s  making a sustained attempt to confer legitimacy 
as oppsition to SWAPO. 
%is situation serves as a clear reminder that apartheid is 
mt purely a danestic South African problem; but cap pervading 
the entire region. Nohhere is this more evident than in 
Namibia, which ranains finnly i n  South Africa's grip. 
Independence is therefore contingent on events within South 
Africa, as they affect Pretoria's assessnent of the strategic 
advantage of retaining control. Because of the nature of these 
South African bonds; Nanibia's political. econcmy has charqed 
l i t t l e  since the late 1970s, despite the abolition of most wert 
apartheid legislation. As I have argued elsewhere (Sinon 1985, 
1986) ; this lack of change also illwtrates that piecemeal legal 
reform alone is illcapable of addressing the basic problens i n  
either Namibia or South Mrica. The relations of production and 
reprcduction systmtised under apartheid are far too deeply 
&ded for that. 
Namibian independence will  therefore need to be foMLl& by 
major restructuring and reorientation of internal relations ard 
external linkages i f  it is to be more than p e l y  token. The 
dimensions of this task can clearly be illustrated with respect 
to the transport sector since it underpins the entire econany; 
fonning the basis of linkages betwen the dws t i c  and external 
danains; and therefore sydmlises graphically either a potential 
m s e  or lifeline for independent Namibia. The second reason 
for fccussing on transport here is its current topicality within 
Nanibia - precisely because of its centrality to  the vhole 
independence and developnent question. 
Xn February 1986 the Advisory Cannittee for Transm 
services (m) m i n t e d  by the interim gwerrment issued a 
controversial report, ostensibly aimed a t  fostering Namibian 
self-sufficiency and independence. Several of its key prop3sals 
muld i n  fact have the opgosite effect. The r e p r t  was 
campiled against the back~romd of the Waft hsational Melopnent 
Strategy issued in 1985 by the Directorate for Developnent Cb- 
ordination (WC) in Windbek. Then i n  July 1986 the Lusaka- 
based United Nations Institute £or Namibia (WIN), established by 
the m to train Namibians for independence and undertake 
appropriate research, lamhed its major s t dy  "Namibia: 
- 
Perspectives for National %construction and Developnent" . 
Unsurprisingly, this contains a rather different set of 
propsitions fran the Windhoek reprts. 
Peflectitq as  they do the divergent plitical/ideolcgical 
ps i t ions  of their Mnpilers, these studies provide a useful 
focus for analysing the future of Nmibian transport within an 
overall developnent p l i c y  context. %is Faper therefore seeks 
to provide a cr i t ical  overview of the debate i n  terns of 
fostering genuine indepndence by tnaximising self-reliance and 
flexibility of options. 
2. HISmICAL IFJFERITmE 
For the sake of brevity, a short sketch of Namibia's 
t ranspr t  history w i l l  suffice. The Geman colonial period 
( 1884-1915) saw the construction of the bulk of hElmibia' S railmy 
network and basis of the road system. (Figure 1). Following 
rapidly after the Schutztruppe d10 subjugated the various 
indigenous groups and e x t d ( d  control over an ever greater area, 
the t r anspr t  infrastructure facilitated the maintenance of 
control and establishnent of a colonial political econany based 
on resource extraction and extensive settler agriculture (e.g. 
Schnidt 1922: Bley 1971). Wansprt clearly served the interests 
of its builders rather than t b s e  of the dispssessed indigenes. 
%hat evolved, there-, 'has not a ne tmk  geared to terri torial  
integration, but a 'dendritic' structure linking administrative 
and military centres, p i n t s  of resource extraction (mines) ; anJ. 
settler fanner service centres to the prts of Swakopnmd/Walvis 
Bay and M e r i t z  by the mst direct route. Ports were crucidl 
ncdes in the network: the paints of contact w i t h  the metroplitan 
rower through which all colonial cantcdity expr t s  and a l l  
manufactures and sllpplies fran Gemanyptssed. 
Under South African control since 1915 the ultimate colonial 
objectives have remain& the w e ,  despite the provisions of the 
league of Nations Mandate and subsequent requirements of the UN 
Trusteeship (Xanttittee, and (43mcil for Namibia. Rapid 
reorientation of the political wonany fran Germany to South 
Africa ooeurred, with almost h d i a t e  connection of the railway 
line a t  Kara&urg t o  the South African network a t  &%p on the 
border, and extension of the S.ekopnwd line to the larger 
adjacent p r t o f  Walvis Bay in the enclave cc81trolled and claimed 
as sovereign territory by South Africa (cf. Prinslm 1977: 
Moorson 1984). The Outjo and -is bramh lines were also 
constructed. A l l  told, these additions added only 4l&km to the 
German network of 2160km (Dierks 1985) . Nevertheless, the road 
system and prt a t  YlBlvis Bay lmve been greatly expded  and 
improved, airports constructed and flights instituted, and 
facili t ies mcxlernised in line with econanic exps ion ;  military 
requirements and techmlcgical change. 
NAMIBIA: P O L I T I C A L  GEOGRAPHY 
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Early analyses of colonial network evolution and transport 
issues (e.g. Taaffe, Morrill and Gould 1963: O ' C o m r  1965) 
fbcmsed on their mcdernising influence rather than their role in 
colonial exploitation. They cannot explain, for exanple; wh,y 
the most populous am3 agriculturally productive areas of P3amibia 
- the mrthern reserves - have been almost totally bypassed by 
the t ranspr t  infrastructure and exclm3& frm the morlern econany 
except as  vi tal  cheap labour reservoirs. mr can they explain 
the relative overconcentration of transport in the arid, sparsely 
ppulated south: or  the major discrepancies of accessibility and 
t ranspr t  facili t ies between the formerly segregated t rk l i t e ,  
coloured and black areas a t  the intra-urban scale. 
Independence w i l l  require the breaking of colonial 
deperdeme and reorientation of t ranspr t  and overall developnent 
policies towards territorial  integration and N f i l l i n g  the needs 
of Nanibia's mula t ion in the f i r s t  instance. It is  in this  
light than we now turn to examine the recent proposals. 
The DM: dacunent sees its £unction as providing a total 
national strategy £or developnent to ensure optimal results and 
avoid ad hoc planning. It is the praduct of a public conference 
and several c d t t e e s  incorprating both civi l  sewants and 
private sector representatives; it can sa£ely be assund to 
reflect the ps i t ions  of these interest group. 
After an ini t ial  statement of goats and approach, the r e p r t  
provides an averview of the econany and physical franework before 
treating the sectors individmlly. Rather than being 
prescriptive in detail; it establiskes a hierarchical set of 
brwd objectives, policies and strategies for each division of 
each sector as  a guide to planners in the respective departments. 
Three primaryobjectives are stated 
1) people-centred developnent to activate individuals and 
the cormunity and enhance valu? and abilities: 
2) raising the quality of l i f e  and welfare of each 
inhabitant through rapid am3 sustained ecomic  and 
soeial developnent which must be distributed as widely 
as  possible: 
3) maximising M's indepndence in the ecca~anic  and other 
spheres by putting its interests f i rs t .  
These are to be plrsued by praMting a h e e  market econanic 
system (which, it is claimed, maximises econanic prcgress £or the 
cannunity as  a whole): minimising restrictive lam a& 
regulaticms: encouraging the infonnal sector: pranoting c m m i t y  
and hunan developnent: creating appropriate implanentation 
mechanisms: and ensuring the appropriateness of pmpsals  to the 
respective canmcnities. 
Sectoral goals for infrastructure include optimal 
maintenance and full utilisation of existing infrastructure; 
developent of new infrastructure only on the basis of cost- 
benefit analysis results to ensure viability and consideratim of 
both direct and indirect implcts: giving priority to 
infrastructure that is in accordance with developent needs 
esmial ly  in the ccmnmal areas: giving priority to 
infrastructure which w i l l  exploit existing resources or prwide 
ptential services: ensuring appropriateness to the particular 
caaunity or region, making maximun use of local resources and 
materials in a free m a r k e t  system: seeking to recanrer 
quantifiable infrastructural costs £ran direct beneficiaries, and 
full camunity involvan~nt in planning and utilisation. 
Little fault can be found with the stated primary 
chjetives, and the intention to maximise independence is 
significant. %%ever, there is a fundaental a n i s s h  in that 
no reference is mde to the need for territorial integration to 
wercane the spatial-structural divisims of past policy. Y t  is 
therefore unclear how much of a radical policy change is actually 
envisaged. Furthermre; the caunitment to a minimally 
constrained capitalist e co~ny  as the prime agent of developnent 
is misplaced i n  the sense that what is materially advantageous to 
an individual or firm is by no means necessarily advantageovs to 
the ccmndty or country, particularly given the structural. 
inequalities of a Third Wrld cowtry. me colonial legacy 
bears clear witness to that. Nar i s  state capitalisn the answer; 
rather a mixed e m m y  with strong mcprat ive mcxranent, arad 
joint ventures between state a d  private sectors should be 
striven for. 
The 'user pp' principle of infrastruetural provision is 
also inappropriate to a highly unequal society such as Nsnibia, 
be it a t  the interregional, urban-rural or intra-urban level. 
By definition those most in need of new facilities and services 
axe also the least able to afford than. If a l l  costs m u s t  be 
directly recwerable £ran the pmr; inequalities will never be 
overcane; particularly as this principle w d d  be amlied 
wether w i t h  the 'appropriateness of prmision' objective; thus 
restricting maintenance or new facilities in poor areas to 
inadequatelybasic levels. Cross-s&sidisation is an established 
principle, and one surely essential i f  the poor aren't to becane 
m r e r  relative to  the rich. State intervention is necessary to 
achieve this. ?he impact of these principles on more detailed 
propsals w i l l  be discussed in relation to the ACPS report. 
Chapter 3 of the report argues - in contradiction to the 
cartcgrapkic evidence it cites - that all  aspects of 
infrastructure spill wer &can the developed central areas i n t o  
the 'developing carmunal areas' without a reductim in standards. 
'Ihe latter are therehre being supported by the former. With a 
few exceptions; basic infrastructure i s  thus fully prarided and 
its firture develapnent will  follow rather than precede ecormnic 
developnent (DDC 1985:17). This assertion blatantly cmflicts 
with the sectoral goals set - out in Chapter 1 and sum\arised 
above. They see new infrastructural investment as  necessary and 
developnent pranating; especially in the 'cannun& areas'. 
Chapter 17 deals exclrsively w i t h  transport and highlights 
the important role still played by South Africa. ?Pae Nanibian 
Depirtment of Transport controls roads; road transprt; and 
traffic control, while traffic safety; civil aviation and witer 
traffic are still Mntrolled by the equivalent department in S.A. 
M e m e ,  the South African Transport Services (SA%) operate 
a l l  fixed assets and rolling stack of the railmys, harbours and 
South African ?&ways. Wirdhek and Keetmanshaop airgnrts have, 
howwer, been transferred to Namibia. In April 1985 aatership 
of the SATS assets was transferred to Nmibiar which mw has to 
carry the annual. aperating loss; estimated a t  R70m fPr 1985/66. 
sATS continue to operate the actual services on behalf of the 
interim gwerrment. ?he valw of assets transferred wis almost 
R145m and excluded those of Ijouth African A h a y s  and Walvis Bay 
(DDc 1985:139). 51% of the shares in Mib Air were bought by 
the Windhoek authorities in 1981, bu t the  airline is still 
p r a t e d  by the minority shareholder; the South African M i n e  
mrpration. Nanib Air is intended to fbrm the basis of a 
future national airline. South Africa still mtrc,ls all 
aspects of the licensing and registration of airfields, aircraft 
and pilots; as wel l  as a l l  international air  transfr,rt matters 
since Nanibia is mt reccgnised as a mereign corntry by the 
relevant mrld bcdies. 
?he major cbjective w i t h  regard to roads is stated as  
creation of an effective network to pramte ecomnic dENelapnent 
while taking into account social; strategic and emirormental 
factors. Policy is tr, inc lde  wrading main roads ta 
accmncdate the increase in traffic; connecting major centres 
effectively; extension of roads ta certain graYth p i n t s  to 
stimulate more rapid developnent, praviding connections to 
pramte tourism, and building a l l  weather roads to neigrnuring 
countries. 
&re again the r e p r t  emghasises the use of roads to 
stimulate developnent, contradicting the assertion in Chapter 3. 
It is also mcleax &ether 'strategic factors' refer to those of 
South Africa (especially military) or Namibia. 
In the civi l  aviation m e r e ,  major objectives are opt- 
p r d o n  of aviation to the benefit of all spheres of national 
developnent and internaticnal prqress in the region: 
encouragement of international a i r  services and establishment of 
a national airline. These are to be achieved through obtainiw 
international recognition in civi l  aviation, im~ovenent of 
facili t ies and infrastructure; and developnent of Windhoek's 
international airprt as a regional hub. The last-mcntioned 
seems rather optimistic since Harare, Lusaka and L u d a  all have 
existing intercontinental links, and Gaborone w i l l  do so before 
the end of this year. 
In the field of mter traffic, the intention is to create a 
lccal marine corps, and to act in unison with South Africa to 
protect mutual maritime and territorial Hater interests; except 
where such interests conflict. Abilateral agreement aver use 
of Wvis  Bay's harbour is propsed for mutual benefit; while 
developnent of a new Namibian p t  is seen as financially 
mfeasible and an unjustifiable dlplication of facilities. 
The benefits of co-operation clearly depend on the terns, 
and although it is not stated in the report; potential conflict 
could well arise wer Walvis Bay and the Orange River mu'& 
diamond fields. mere is actually a strong legal and moral case 
£or Namibian ownership of Walvis Bay (e.g. Wrsan 1984: Prescott 
1979). lhis wutd drviate the need for a treaty and liberate 
Nanibia' S major external econanic lifeline frcm the threat of 
blackmail. 
Overall, the Draft Strategy has been show to have somd 
objectives, as far as they go; but sane problenatic or 
contrdictory strategic and policy guidelines a t  hoth sectoral 
and subsectoral levels. -er, the absence of a carmi-hnent to 
national integration and transformation seen in conjmction with 
the minimally regulated free market approach; strongly suggests 
that the Obje~tive is actually ecomic developnent-led 
mcdernisation. In the fallowing sec?ticn, we consider ipw 
mnpatible the more detailed FI;TS r e p r t  is with this frmcmrk, 
and what effect sane of its major prop3sals muld have. 
4. TFE~AIIBISCWY'CCEIQJI~~FOR~WS#IRT" SERWm 
a) objectives arid-Stance 
This camnittee, canprising senior civil senrants; was 
required to recannend the mst effective an3 econanical transprt 
system for, am3 in the interests of, Namibia and its people. 
Their reprt p-rts to  be wholly consistent with the Wa£t 
Developnent Strategy, although this is not alwys evident &cm 
sane of its recannenrtations. There certainly are proposals to 
create an auto-us Namibian a8ministrative and legislative 
strudure in spheres currently controlled by gbuth Africa. 
Fbwver; there is a signal failure to state or take into accowt 
the fact that, as discussed earlier, many of the fundanental 
structural and ecomnic problens facing an independent Namibia 
are largely due to the gbuth A£rican orientation of the transprt 
system. The same is true of the Welopnent Strategy (see 
previous section). A s  Dierks (1986:l) &served, this anissim 
" . . .creates the impcession that again; as ms the case with 
past reports . . . the status qtn has to be maintained as far 
as pssible in t k  interest of South Africa and a new 
Namibia-related transprt policy is allowed only i f  it is 
not ccbltradictory to South African transport W r e s t s .  
Any real Nanibia-related transpxt palicy w i l l  in many 
aspects be contradictory to South African transfbrt 
- 
interests." 
me of the report's strengths is that it includes a wide 
range of useful data; mostly never before made public. Of 
course, the usual westions of accuracy and reliability arise. 
Fbr exanple, the results of a 1984 road gocds vehicle survey - on 
the basis of vhich certain @icy re~rmendations are made - make 
no sense in  the my  they are presented (ACTS 1986:55-6). 
Additional data and infornation on the actual survey and analysis 
are needed: the impression given in the report is of p r  survey 
work and mjustified deductions based cm that. 
The fundmental theme of &e r e p r t  is that subsidies are 
undesirable and a l l  infrrastructural casts should be recoverable 
fran the direct beneficiaries. This is seen as the only my of 
reducing state involvanent; keeping gavernnent experditure in 
check and pmnoting the ' Bee market system' . & this basis, 
Namibia is prtrayed a s  werendowed with an ininfrastructure it 
cannot afford. Rationalisations are accordingly recumnded 
witbut refererre either to the ptent ia l ly  imprtant 
deve lqes t ,  sccial and strategic mles of infrastructure (sane 
of which are set out in the Draft Developnent Stratqy),  or the 
fdamental political/strategic problem of South African 
orientation referred to abwe. 
b) Railmys: -the"t&thYioltqy'Emnplified 
This attitude is p e r h q  most clearly illustrated with 
respect to the railway netwk.  Rail services have 
traditionally r m  a t  a loss. Recent figures range frcm R70.h 
in 1981/2 to R54.lm in 19&4/5, a decline of 23%. Over the same 
period tke total tonnage lifted fell by 37.5% and tonnes moved 
(i.e. tonne-kilanetres) by 35.8%, due mainly to the effects of 
droqht; the Wr ec-ic conditions, constitutional 
uncertainty, declining coal usage by stat ims (major 
traditional custmers) and intermcdal canptition (XTS 
1986:37,40). The evident relatianshipbetween the level of 
aperations and level of financial loss is apparently werlcoked 
in  a sector-by-sector analysis of the netwk.  1984/5 
utilisation figures for the track were prt icularly low zn the 
three branch lines Otjiwarongo-Outjo (10%) ; SeeheimTuderitz 
(14%) and Gamnz~nsGobabis (16%). Capacity utilisation of trains 
on these lines was 45%; 71% and 48% respectively, and the 
financial loss Rlm, R5m and m.2m respctively (P17IS 1986:39;49). 
These figures mke it clear that the most severe 'proh2em' 
with the abwementioned branch lines is the low lwel of track 
rather than train utilisation. The tonnage conveyed on than in 
19€!4/5 was 19% of the national. total; arvd tonne-kilcmetres m e d  
3.9%. while they accounted for 15.2% of the overall financial 
loss. W s e  losses are acceptable in t e n s  of tcnnage but 
dispropxtionately high for the tonne-kilanetres. In ather 
words canparatively d l  tonnages are being w e d  wer very long 
distances. - 
Brmh l he  closures: As part of its rationalisation plan; 
the rep* reccmnended that a l l  of the Otjiwarongo-Outjo line and 
the least viable sections of the other two i.e. Aus - &eritz 
and Strijdan Airprt - Gobabis be closed; the track tom and 
sold to recoup sane monoy (ACIS 1980:127-145). This was seen as 
more practicable than r a t i o~ l ika t i on  of the road networkbecause 
of the other social and primary access functions roads perfonn, 
d i l e  upgrading of both networks was e c ~ i c a l l ~  unjustifiable. 
The impact of closures on mainline traffic, on the road system 
and on users was considered but not the most fundmental 
objection to a t  least twr, of the three closures: that they w i l l  
preclu3e the pursuance of indept?ndent ra i l  transport p l i c i e s  
after indeperdence and make the r a i l  systen totally deperdent on 
access through !&&h Africa. 
Although Gderitz is a &l prt with rjhysical 
characteristics preventing significant enlargement of facilities, 
it is currently the only outlet to the sea ~ i g u 3 u s l y  under 
Mamibian control. It could thus prave vi tal  to the country i f  
access t o  Walvis Bay and/= South African prts is denied. 
AlthDqh inadequate, an3 in need of imprwement, it would be far 
better than nothing. It is currently used mainly for the local 
fishing and ancillary irdustries, ard operates a t  a loss (ACTS 
1986~91-3). lbroughput and hence viability of both the harbour 
and railway line could be increased through zegional develapnmt 
(1 1 and rerouting of CEM supplies through Luderitz instead of 
mrt Nolloth south of the Orange River as  a t  present. Ore fran 
Rash Pinah mine in the far south is currently railed to South 
Africa for exprt.  Sane of this could pssibly be rerouted via 
Lhderitz w i t h  sane new harbour developnent (Dierks 1986). lbe 
railway between L;ideritz and Aus would need qg rad iq  for any 
significant traffic increase (PLITS 1986:12&34). While perhayx3 
mt  currently econanically justifiable; future strategic 
interests might alter the equation. Besides; scragping the 
railmy wuld increase dependence on the nearby road, but its 
capci ty  for heavy g d s  traffic is also limited since a 
significant section is not tarred. lChe net effect might w e l l  be 
a further and lndesirable decline in Gderitz, a factor not 
considered in the report. Once again, econanim appears to have 
been pit before all else. 
?he decision to recarmm-3 closure of the Gcbabis branch line 
similarly tOOk no account of the strategic p ten t ia l  of the 
propsed manskalahari =ilway line to link a major new coalfield 
a t  Palapye in eastern =swarm with a new expi% terminal a t  
Walvis my. Apart fran generating substantial r a i l  revenue and 
harkour dues fran th is  baseload traffic, the line would comect 
with thE? Z i r r k b v e  - South Africa railway ~ c h  traverses 
Wswana; thus praviding Batswarm; Z h b a b w  and other SEX! 
states w i t h  an alternative prt to those in South Ahica and 
k d i q u e  (e.g. Green 1981: S h  1983). 
ofY$xlisation - and picirig plicy: Sane 
30% of the deficit of R54. l m  are accovlted 
for by capital costs; i.e. financing costs, depreciation ard 
additional depreciation costs (higher replacement costs). 
I-L,wever; the capital costs of the actual railway have long siwe 
been paid off. Inclusion of depreciation - qart £ran new 
cmpents ,  e.g. locarotives and rolling stock - in tke financial 
calculations is therefore highly questionable (~ ierks  1986: 4) . 
. - 
This might; in fact, be a device inflate the value of assets 
and the scale of operating deficit - and hence the a m ~ u n t s  
Nanibia had to pay South Africa for transfer of those assets in 
1985 and annual subsidy the W h o e k  authorities w i l l  have to ply 
SATS for operatirig the transprt services. Tfie implications of 
this are cSxriously major - aold further investigation is urgently 
required. 
kcording to the XTS repr t ;  the fundamental problems 
facing the railways are organisational ard financial. SATS is  a 
state organisation; subject to external financial and pl icy  
apprwal . R a i l  services are subject to cannon carrier 
obligations (i.e. &er mm& circunstances a l l  g d s  offered 
£or carriage must be accepted) and tariffs are determined cm a 
valu&of-goods basis. Oonsequently, no~econanic factors must be 
taken into account and unprofitable traffics carried, while the 
tariff structure causes high value gods 121 to be lost to road 
transprt. Predaninantly low valrr gcods are threfore carried 
wer long distances, and internal cross-~Ubsidisatkm of 
services, routes, canncdities and distances is inadequate to 
balarre the baoks. 
In line w i t h  the free market ethos, the wopsed solutions are to 
rid rail  of a l l  social and other policy requirenents unless fully 
mid for; and to gear the organi~tion to amptition with other 
nudes on an equal fcoting. llzis will require restructuring, 
abolition of catmm carrier obligations and other restrictions 
and basing tariffs on costs rather than vale-of-goorls (XTS 
1986:112-121). 
while sune of these recarmerdations may be som3 in free 
m a r k t  terms; they wiU mt advance natioaal developnent as 
required. lhere are hp r t an t  p l i cy  contradictions once again. 
FLnthermore, the r e p t  does m t  mention that current railway 
tariffs are disadvantageous to hTamibian prdwers and consmers 
vis-a-vis auth Africa because of the high transprt canpment in 
all exforts and inprts.  So it is haraly surprising that there 
is no discussion a t  all of MW the pmpsed tariff changes w i l l  
affect the Rmibian cronuny. %is is yet another example of the 
repr t '  S blinkered approach. 
Tne rqort also mtes that 91% are rm in accordance with 
"the econcmic interests and Mal transprt requirements of South 
Africa, and by implication those of SWA/~amibia" (XTS 1986: 113). 
-er, this implication wuld seem to be invalid. The tvm 
nn t r i e s '  interests in these spheres are in many respects 
contradictory. Since m pro~,sals - are made to create a Nanibian 
t r anspr t  or  railwry ut i l i ty ,  or enact regulatory legislation; 
SATS are unlikely to put Namibia's interests abwe those of South 
Africa. 
A t  another level, British exprience suggests that even 
freedan fran c m n  carrier obligaticns and valueof-gocds 
~ i c i n g  are unlikely to create a major turnaround in railwry 
fortunes, especially i f  break-even requirements renain (e.g. Joy 
1971; Nash 1964). 
other ina&quacies h- the- treatmmt oirai lmys:  Even using the 
r e p r t ' s  figures, crit ical appraisdl leads to very different 
conclusions. As pointed out earlier, the three bramh lines 
accounted &r only 15.2% of the 1984/5 deficit. Closure of the 
sections pmpsed wuld save only R3.7m p.a. By far the 
greatest loss was incurred on freigM movements almg the main 
Walvis Bay - Widhoek - &bp line to/fran South Africa. Yet 
this is not earlanarked hr closure "because of the p l i t i c a l ,  
social and strategic implications", although road and sea 
transprt costs apparently c a p r e  favourably with those of ra i l  
(ACTS 1986:1474!). In fairness, the report does suggest closure 
of the line south of Windbek as a pss ib le  future loss-cutting 
measure. Wever, there is no explicit mention of the major 
role of the main railway line and its northern branch to 
Cxotfixltein in sustainirq Iiouth Af'rica' S military presence in 
northern mibia and Angola. Several key questions arise in this 
context. Large tonnages of military hardware and supplies (not 
to mention soldiers on the pssenqer side) are know1 to mwe 
alomj the line. Have these traffics been included in the 
tonnage, tonne-kilanetre and revenue calculations of the 
Carmittee? Are such traffics actually paid for by the S.A. 
Defence Fbrce and, i f  so; a t  f i a t  rates? AFd low;  therefore, 
mUld idepriierce an3 a South African witldrawal affect the 
calculations and railway viability? Scrapping virtually the 
entire ra i l  netwrk is clearly m solution to the deficit problem 
as this nrde has nunerous advantages. No (m inadequate) accomt 
appears to have been taken in the ACTS r e p r t  of several other 
-rtant factors with a bearing on its propsals: 
i) the hpor t  costs of additional vehicles and fuel for 
road transport of goods currently mwed by rail: 
ii) the additional wear a d  tear - and hence maintenance 
costs - an roads after ini t ial  upgrading; 
iii) increased sccial disanenity and pollution fran funes, 
noise and dcst. In urban areas this wuld, together 
with the sheer volune of extra traffic, necessitate 
substantial further expnditure on access impcovements, 
through-route widening and/or construction of bypasses. 
iv) the fact that railways as w e l l  as  roads fulf i l  social, 
developnental and access functions. Cne example must 
snf fice. Because of the r e p r t ' s  narrm-mided 
preoccupation with cost cutting, the abolition of all 
r a i l  plssenger services is reccmneded since they 
incurred a loss of R15.5m in 1964/5 (WE 1986: 155-7 ) . 
No attempt has besn made to exanine the r e a m s  for 
this situation or pss ib le  solutions such as different 
service levels, fare structures, incentives or  railway 
equipnent. h u l d  such services actuallybe expcted 
to break even? Is not the prwision of safe, cheap 
low distance public transmrt £Or the low-incane 
majority of Nanibia' s prpulation an imprtant sccial 
service even a t  the cost of state subsidies?l3f The 
propsed solution - relying on unregulated private bus 
oprators - w i l l  rot necessarily result in lm fares 
or prwide adeguate cwerage since by definition only 
profitable routes will be plied, with schdules suiting 
operators rather than passengers. Even in the vastly 
different British envimment , deregulation of coach 
and stage bus services is causing similar problans 
(e.g. C&illh, Nash and bbckie, 1985). 
v) appropriate standards for a Thin3 mrld country. 
Although the r e p r t  em-sises the Camittee's 
conviction that inappropriately high standards have 
frequently been applied t6 both ra i l  and mad networks 
in the past, and that these should be revised when 
existing infrastructure is replaced (ETS 1906:149), no 
mention is made of this being necessary far new 
infrastructure, which is far more hnprtant. Nor; 
contradictorily, has th is  thinking been appried in any 
way to the remrt '  s negative evalmtions of existing 
facili t ies and services; especially rail .  
c) General Orrmmts 
Similar argunents can be applied to other t ranspr t  males. pierks 
(1986) has prwided a detailed critique of the r e p r t '  s analysis 
and rec-dations. In developent tenns, the mt jo  branch 
railway should be retained an3 pssibly extended mrth to the 
ppulom and ferti le areas of Ovaibland. lkis would change b t h  
the role and financial fartunes of the railways. &W trmk and 
especially feeder roads are required in a i l  the northern 
'cmnunal areas' to integrate the space ecamny and redress the 
existing bias in favour of the former ate core areas. In so 
doing use must be made of appropriate design, technolqy an3 
service standards. lhis wuld dramatically enhance wodmtion 
(assuning the correct policy measures in agriculture an3 
processing) ; werall developat  prospects and e i l i t y .  
Overa l l ,  then; the AC.F.9 r epx t  can be smarised for the 
most part as 'M new'. lhe analysis is inad-te and 
na rmly  financial, to the exclusion of other p s i t i ve  policies, 
despite its supposed grounding in the Wa£t Developent Plan's 
objectives. Many of the p p s a l s  would exacerbate the isolaticm 
of rural 'ccnmmal areas' , increasing the core-periphery divide, 
run down existing infrastructure to the detriment of the corntry 
a t  large; at%3 increase rather than decrease 1Samibia's dependence 
on South Africa. ?here is also m substantive consideration of 
the need to -we land links with neigkrbouring comtries, which 
should 'be a strategic priority. Ebrtwtely, the r a i l  closure 
propsals proved so contentious that i n  July the interim 
gwerment annocnced their suspension and referral to a cabinet 
camittee for further s t dy  (Nanibian 18/7/86). 
5 .  TB3 UN3X'ED' NATIONS " INSTITWE' FOR*NIWfBUli STLlDY 
This hpr t an t  new s t d y  outlines a radically different 
pst-irdependence prcqramne Eran that of the Advisory Caunittee. 
"It would be ... absmd to assune that the goals of an 
indep@ndent Nmibian gwernnent muld km to run the present 
econanic system sanahat more efficiently w i t h  a nunber of 
black faces replacing white ones but with no basic changes 
in structure or mcde of prcduction or in incane 
distributim. The relevant political econanic £ram within 
d c h  to address econanic options to assess pssibilities 
am3 to evaluate pssible outcunes is that of the Liberation 
Wenent ." (UNIN 1986: 59). 
SYAEO's pl i t ica l  emnmics of liberation can swmarised from 
their 1976 Political Programne as canprising s ix  general 
canpnents : 
i) cnmnitment U1 attaining a socialist made of prcduction 
after an initial transition *rid. Public utilities 
(presun&ly incltfling transprt) are inclded in the 
initial minimun public sector: 
ii) rural developnent based cm ~flprehSIsive agrarian 
reform to give ' l a d  to the tillersi; 
iii) redistribution of walth and incaoe to eliminate 
exploitation; and urban-rural and interregional 
differences: 
iv) national developnent through national econanic 
integration and self-reliance. Included here is a 
camitment to cutting all ties w i t h  South Africa ultil 
the attainnent of d-ratic majority rule there: 
V) provision of basic services (health and ducation) in 
the widest sense, appropriate to neds and self- 
reliance ; 
vi) ppular prticipttion a t  a l l  levels, CO-wat ive  and 
ccnmmity action aim& at  creation of a vanglard p r t y  
and ultimately a classless scciety (%PO 1976: WIN 
1986 1. 
In line with these (rather broad and idealistic) objectives; 
anrl bearing inmind current realities; the WIN s tdy  argues the 
need for an initial policy of stabilising the core of present 
prodwtion, restructuring the budget, cutting expenditure, 
increasing incanes of both rural and urban psor M l e  biding 
werall consunptim static, rapidly training Nsnibians for middle 
and high level psts; d i l i s i n g  substantial external resources 
ard weparing for medim term - prcdwtion restructuring (WIN 
A t  least 2 of the nine priorities identified for the first  
five years of irdeperdence relate directly to transprt: 
- mtainment of transport costs (including subsidies), 
prdbably involving radical cuts in railways expenaiture and 
services parallel to increasing access to road transprt and 
rerouting the tw-thirds of external trade fran South African to 
Namibian ports. 
- restructuring external econanic flow (exprts, imprts, 
finarre sources) amy fran South Africa; entailing new public ard 
private enterprises, data and management controls (UNIN 
1986:lOl-2) . 
The bulk of the study canprises sectoral and topical 
analyses; with one chapter devoted to transport a d  
ccmnunications. Unkrtmately it was written before plblication 
of the ACTS report, and therefore relies on an assemblage of the 
fra~gnattary data previously available. 
It points out that the apparent SATS operating deficits on 
the Namjbian railways conceal tbt facts that these opsrations 
reduce the deficit on the mrthwst Cape line to Upington inside 
South Africa, bcost oprating surplwes on South African main 
lines, and help cwer additional werheads. ~*sidisirq the 
mibian loss is not an act of generosity, as claimed by SDuth 
Africa, because the entire South African netmrk i s  rm a t  a loss 
for ecomnic policy reasons: the main beneficiaries of these 
losses are mt Nmibians but South A&ican beef consuners, 
indwtries using Namibian exprts or exlprting to Namibia: and 
because South Africa linked its railmy to Nsnibia's for its avn 
strategic and econanic interests; which remain valid to-day (UNIN 
1986:395). iZlese argunents canplenent those raised in the 
pevious section. 
Nothing is said about pssible future rail network policy: 
by contrast the section on roads argues the needs for mre labour 
intensive road nmstruction methaas, a review of the netuiork to 
ascertait priorities for its extension (especially into the 
reserves) . Six priorities are suggested: 
i) constrwtion of rural feeder roads integrated with the 
rail netmrk; 
ii) rationalisation of war-time roads against new needs of 
national reconstruction and dwelopnent : 
iii) construction and impp:ovenent of road links with 
Nmibia' S neiglkours : 
iv) proviaion of affkmkble plhlic Fassenger transprt, 
with state subsidies i f  required: 
V) creation of a state controlled or regulated haulage 
utility: 
vi) maintenance of a ~kele ta l  mzd service in accordance 
w i t h  the level of trade (UNIN 1986:3%-401). 
The feeder roads sbuld; of course, link up with trmk and main 
roads as  wll as the railway; especially as the lat ter  does not 
serve the niost densely ppulated regions in the north. The 
haulage operation is presmn&ly intenc3ed to replace the large 
SATS vehicle £let currently serving areas away f m  railway 
routes, but on a more socially desirable basis, in terms of 
~ i o r i t y  (vi).  
In the maritime sphere, the study advocates increasing port 
capacity t o  cope with increased throughput frcm SADCC comtries. 
Apart £run providing additional jetty facili t ies and barges a t  
existing prts; and pssibly Swakopund~ construction of a new 
port alorq the northern coast is m t e d .  A B m i b i a  Shipping 
arporation to ruersee maritime t r a n s p t  is also envisaged. A s  
for civi l  aviation, the aewisition of additional aircraft and 
expansion of hcth danestic and regianal flights is pmpsed (WIN 
1986:401-5). lhever; the suggested service level muld require 
more aircraft than envisaged: nothing is said abaut operating to 
South Africa or  the future of existing South African Airways 
services to Wirx3-k anrl Keetmansfiaop. 
Nevertheless, delinking £run South Africa is seen as 
-rtant. An imnediate stixly to ascertain likely expert 
requirements; and the training of r J a m i b h s  to f i l l  operational 
psts and devise prcgramnes a t  irdepenrlence are urged. Cargo 
should be diverted away £ran the South African ra i l  link as  £ar 
as pssible,  and the physical requirements for doing so 
ascertained, including studies on construction of bulk loading 
and general cargo facili t ies a t  the ports. bad links with 
Namibia' S neig'kours should be improved, and the caplcity created 
r operating all transprt infrastructure and services. 
Overall; though it will be necessary i n  the ehort term to 
maintain operation of inherited transport services, ard 
rehabilitate h s e  affected by ~ a r  o  the deprture of South 
African personnel. (WIN 1986:407-8; 413) . 
As regards finance, the study does not go beqrand a general 
discussion of the alternative strategies of repiring state 
sector organisations to oprate  catmercially; i .e . break even, 
and pmiding sribsidies on social policy grounds. Subsidies 
should be limited, i f  possible, w i t h  oprational cross- 
s&sidisation ard the pricing of services used mainly by up- 
incane groups a t  surplm-yielding levels. Furthermore, a l l  
possible nowprejudicial cost cutting measures, e.g. rerlwing 
over-staffing a d  importing fuel fran Efviapr sources than &uth 
Africa, should be implemented. The inherited financial and 
institutional arrangements will need restructuring in line w i t h  
the new political cronanic order (WIN 1986:409-13). 
Overall; the WIN study contains policy objectives and 
guidelines consisteat with SWAPO's stated ccnmitment to sccial 
transformation, self-reliance; disengqanent hon South Africa 
and ultimately a socialist mde of prciiuction. Given the dearth 
of data available to its authors, most recamendations in the 
transport sphere are of necessity qualitative rather than 
quantitative. This aim precldes detailed cunnent on them, 
apart fran minting to one or t w a  gaps (e.g. the lack of mention 
of tb advisability/necessity of maintaining direct a i r  links 
with South Africa) or  pss ib le  contradictions (e.g. between the 
likelihwd of significant r a i l  sewice cuts as  suggested in the 
intrdwtmry chapter; and the goal of maintaining inherited 
transflrt services i n  tb short term). In a f e w  cases, newly 
available data or  recent developnents chaqe the canplexion of 
specific propsitions. For example, the transfer of fixed and 
mairable assets to the Nanibian authorities in  1985 presunably 
reduces tb likelihood of their being withdrawn a t  indepenaence - 
and hence the need to acquire new rolling stmk. No 
ackn~wledganent is given in the context of planning and prmnnel 
requirenents that training of rJanibians for smi-skilled and sane 
skilled psts has been increased inside the country in recent 
years. And availability of data contained in the ACTS report 
would have enabled a more soghisticated analysis. 
It would he mfair to canwe  the WIN study directly with 
the ?CTS report, since the former is a caqyehensive statement of 
p l i t i c a l  eco~aic orientation, developnent objectives and ikirly 
broad statement of sectoral priorities. As such it is far 
s ~ r i o r  to the interim goverment's Draft Lkvelopnent Plan, in 
terns of consistency, appropriateness, detail of content, am3 
analysis. Unlike the 2 Windbek ddacunents; the WIN study sets 
out essential and consistent parznneters and attempts to f i l l  in 
the details accordingly. Hence, for example, subsidies are 
accepted a s  a necessary means t o  balance developnent in the 
desired my. 
By contrast, the fDC plan and ACTS relprt. vhile pro&ssing 
the goals of hbmibian indepndence and social developn~nt, 
actually subordinate these to South African interests and to 
pmnation of minimally regulated free m a r k e t  capitalism It is 
therefore hardly surprising that contradictions abound. The 
analysis is frequently superficial i f  r o t  erroneous and 
conflicting statenents have been detected between sections of the 
same remrt  . Many of their F o p s a l s  muld, i f  implmented, be 
hannful to mibia i tself  and/or increase dependence on gouth 
Mrica. Tranqprt p l i c y  i n  an indepindent Emibia is bound to 
be contradictory to South African interests. 
1986 has witnessed the publication of an mprecedented 
volune of material on the future of Nanibian developnent, a d  the 
critical role of t r anspr t  therein, frcm -sing camp. 
Whatever the shortcanings of these dacunents, t b y  have made 
imlprtant new data available and fuelled informed debate both 
inside ard outside the corntry. Nevertheless, a tremerdous 
amomt of work remains to be done. Vnfortmately, circunstances 
dictate that much of the detailed in sit0 docunentation and 
- 
- -  
planning w i l l  mt be p s s i b l e  before implementation of the IN 
pace plan mbcdied in Wsalution 435, and the attairment of 
independence. This rmains the daninant priority. 
1 Only tm aspc t s  of Ms were considered in the relprt and 
disnissed as likely generators of r a i l  traffic:developnent 
of the Kudu offshore gas field ancl use of merit2 £or 
discharge of fuel for ciouthexn Nanibia (WE 1986:133-4). 
2 The major ccmnercial ccmnalities (in tenns of tonnage) 
carried are coal; base metal ores; cenent; salt sand and 
gravel, cereals, livestock and ptroleun. These are mainly 
low valw t o  bulk, thus fall* into low tariff  b a d s  ard 
m t  covering full  operating casts. Data in the r e p r t  show 
tbt the discrepamybetween costs and revenue increases 
slightly with length of haul. 
3. !the various argunents in  favour of, a gwerment 
ccnstraints on, t provision of subsidies are wll 
outlined in Palmer, milliam and &sh (1984). Alihugh 
allowanas must be made for the many imprtant differences 
betwen British Namibia conditions; the mderlying 
principles are in  many respects valid. More specifically, 
Eash (1934:243) has &m 
"that the designation of sane sectors iof British 
Rail's operations) a s  being purely cattnemial is 
inappropriate, since that means that M e f i t s  to users 
and to the carmunity a t  large are ignored in ddecisioe 
making. Similarly; the direction to maintain 'social' 
passenger services a t  a given level means tbt finance 
and investment are concentrated d u l y  on -peervation 
of the existing pattern of service rather than on 
providing valw for money.. . the criterion of 
maximising the (weighted) volune of traffic carried is 
advocated as a practical way of clnosing between 
alternative fare and service level packages." 
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